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“In those drunk-driving investigations where police officers can
reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without
significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth
Amendment mandates that they do so.” 1

Introduction
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, 2 the United States Supreme Court will
decide whether North Dakota may criminalize the refusal to consent to a
warrantless blood test. N.D. Century Code §§ 39-20-1 and 39-08-01 permit
and provide in relevant part as follows, respectively:
A chemical test, or tests, of the individual's blood, breath, or urine
to determine the alcohol concentration or presence of other drugs,
or combination thereof, in the individual’s blood, breath, or urine,
at the direction of a law enforcement officer under section 3906.2-10.2 if the individual is driving or is in actual physical
control of a commercial motor vehicle; or . . . a chemical test, or
tests, of the individual’s blood, breath, or urine to determine the
alcohol concentration or presence of other drugs, or combination
thereof, in the individual's blood, breath, or urine, at the direction
of a law enforcement officer under section. 3
***
An individual who operates a motor vehicle on a highway or on
public or private areas to which the public has a right of access
for vehicular use in this state who refuses to submit to a chemical
test, or tests, required under section . . . is guilty of an offense
under this section. 4
On its face, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1 authorizes law enforcement
to conduct warrantless blood tests in every case, regardless of whether law
enforcement officers are faced with exigent circumstances, and N.D.
1. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013) (citing McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)) (“We cannot . . . excuse the absence of a search warrant
without a showing by those who seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the
exigencies of the situation made [the search] imperative.”).
2. No. 14-1468, consolidated with Bernard v. Minnesota, No. 14-1470.
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-1 (emphasis added).
4. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01.
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Century Code § 39-08-01 criminalizes in every case a motorist’s refusal to
consent to such tests.
In this Article we argue that both provisions violate the Fourth
Amendment. 5 First, in violation of McNeely, N.D. Century Code §§ 39-201 establishes a per se exception to the warrant requirement and forecloses a
case-by-case evaluation of whether a warrantless blood test, given the facts
of a particular case, is reasonable. Second, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1
provides law enforcement officers with less intrusive means—breathalyzer
and urine tests—to obtain the same evidence. 6 Finally, given that
technological advances in warrant procurement procedures often give law
enforcement ample time to obtain a warrant without risking dissipation in a
motorist’s blood-alcohol level, 7 there is little, if any, need to conduct a
warrantless blood test of every motorist suspected of driving while
intoxicated. For these reasons, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1 fails to pass
constitutional muster. Additionally, since the statutory provision upon
which the crime for refusal is predicated (N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1)
fails to withstand constitutional scrutiny, a refusal to consent under § 39-0801 is unconstitutional as well.
However, the Court cannot rely solely on McNeely in analyzing
N.D. Century Code §§ 39-20-1 and 39-08-01 because in McNeely the fourmember plurality did not address the constitutionality of criminalizing a
motorist’s refusal to consent, although the plurality suggested that civil
penalties and inferences of guilt are permissible. 8 Thus, it remains an open
question whether criminal penalties for refusing warrantless blood tests (or
breathalyzer and urine tests) are constitutionally permissible, particularly in
contexts, unlike Birchfield, where the underlying statute is constitutional.
This Article posits that the Court’s reasoning in Riley offers a useful model
for answering this question, and that it supports the conclusion that N.D.
Century Code § 39-08-01 violates the Fourth Amendment.

5. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
6. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-1 (outlining what the stated statute provides).
7. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1562 (describing how technological advances impact
DUI investigations).
8. See id. at 1566 (noting that “[s]uch laws impose significant consequences when a
motorist withdraws consent; typically the motorist's driver's license is immediately
suspended or revoked, and most States allow the motorist's refusal to take a BAC test to be
used as evidence against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution”).
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By way of background, in Riley the Court unanimously held that,
absent exigent circumstances, warrantless searches of cell phones incident
to arrest are unreasonable and therefore violate the Fourth Amendment. 9
The outcome in Riley can be traced to Chimel v. California, 10 in which the
Court held that warrantless searches incident to arrest were permissible to
protect officers’ safety and prevent arrestees from destroying evidence. 11 As
a result, law enforcement officers were permitted to conduct warrantless
searches of an arrestee’s person and areas within an arrestee’s reach.12 In
subsequent cases, however, the Court relied on Chimel’s bright-line rule to
uphold searches that did not implicate officer safety and evidence
preservation. For example, in New York v. Belton, 13 the Court held that law
enforcement officers could search a passenger compartment incident to
arrest even though the suspect was in police custody and there was no risk
that evidence would be destroyed. 14 In Arizona v. Gant, 15 the Court also
relied on Chimel to uphold searches of a passenger compartment if officers
reasonably believed that it contained evidence related to the crime of

9. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014). By way of background, in Riley
the Court held that the two justifications underlying searches incident to arrest—protecting
officer safety and preserving evidence—did not justify warrantless searches of cell phones
absent exigent circumstances. Noting that cell phones have “immense storage capacity” and
hold “for many Americans, ‘the privacies of life, the Court held, for Fourth Amendment
purposes, that cell phones are qualitatively and quantitatively different than searches of finite
objects, such as a plastic container or passenger compartment. See id. at 2489, 2493–95
(quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886)). Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Roberts explained:
First, a cell phone collects in one place many distinct types of information—an
address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video—that reveal much
more in combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phone's capacity
allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously
possible. The sum of an individual's private life can be reconstructed through a
thousand photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same
cannot be said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet. Third,
the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the phone, or even earlier.
A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr.
Jones; he would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for
the past several months.
Id.
10. See generally Chimel v. Calfornia, 359 U.S. 752 (1969).
11. Id. at 763.
12. Id. at 762–63.
13. See generally New York. v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
14. Id. at 462–63.
15. See generally Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
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arrest. 16 The Court’s holdings in Belton and Gant demonstrated that the
bright-line rule adopted in Chimel had been expanded to such a degree that
the original justifications for the search incident to arrest doctrine were little
more than an afterthought.
In Riley, the Court ended this charade, holding that warrantless cell
phone searches did not implicate, and were entirely divorced from, the
original justifications underlying the search incident to arrest doctrine.
Thus, absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement officers could not
search a cell phone without a warrant. 17 In so holding, Court curtailed a
decades-old and unprincipled expansion of the search incident to arrest
doctrine in which searches of passenger compartments, plastic containers,
and other objects were upheld even though officer safety and evidence
preservation were not implicated. What’s more, the Court reached this
result even though arrestees, like citizens operating motor vehicles on
public roads, enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy. 18
In Birchfield, the Court should apply the same reasoning. Although
courts have repeatedly held that the interest in deterring drunk driving
supports laws that compel motorists, by virtue of operating a motor vehicle,
to implicitly consent to field, breathalyzer, and urine tests, and impose civil
penalties or draw inferences of guilt from a motorist’s refusal, here North
Dakota goes a step further by making the refusal an independent crime. To
make matters worse, since the underlying statutory provision (N.D. Century
Code § 39-20-01) authorizes warrantless blood tests in every case, the
withholding of consent is always an offense, even in cases where such
searches ultimately are deemed unreasonable, thus rendering the
withholding of consent lawful. Finally, given the availability of breath and
urine tests, law enforcement officer have alternative and less intrusive
16. Id. at 343.
17. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014) (stating under what
circumstance a law enforcement officer may search a cell phone without a warrant).
18. See id. at 2588 (“The fact that an arrestee has diminished privacy interests does not
mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely. Not every search ‘is
acceptable solely because a person is in custody.’” (quoting Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.
1958–79 (2013))); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 379 (1976) (noting that “the
traditional expectation of privacy in an automobile is significantly less than the
traditional expectation of privacy associated with the home”); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974) (“One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of
personal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public
thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”); cf. United States
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953–54 (2012) (holding that the use of a GPS tracking device to
monitor a motorist’s movements for twenty-eight days violated the Fourth Amendment).
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means at their disposal to arrest suspects for driving while intoxicated and
therefore vindicate the interest in protecting public safety. For these
reasons, criminalizing a refusal to consent represents an unprecedented
expansion of the implicit consent doctrine in the same way that searches of
passenger compartments and plastic containers represented an
unprecedented expansion of the search incident to arrest doctrine.
Accordingly, N.D. Century Code § 39-08-01 violates the Fourth
Amendment.
At bottom, North Dakota is attempting to achieve through legislation
what it could not accomplish under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, by
authorizing warrantless blood tests in every case, North Dakota is
attempting to evade the holding in McNeely, which requires a case-by-case
evaluation of the constitutionality of warrantless searches. Additionally,
North Dakota seeks to criminalize a suspect’s refusal to submit to such test,
even though, in some cases, that refusal will be lawful if the search itself is
unreasonable. As in Riley, the Court in Birchfield can put an abrupt end to
this practice by holding that law enforcement may not perform warrantless
blood tests unless officers are faced with truly exigent circumstances. In the
absence of exigent circumstances, the message to states that seek to force
motorists, under threat of criminal prosecution, to undergo warrantless
blood tests should be simple—get a warrant. 19 Part II examines N.D.
Century Code § 39-20-01 and explains why it should be invalidated. Part III
discusses N.D. Century Code § 39-08-01 and, analogizing to Riley, argues
that it exceeds law enforcement investigatory authority under the implied
consent doctrine and thus violates the Fourth Amendment.
II. Laws Authorizing Warrantless Blood Tests Regardless of the
Circumstances, Are Unreasonable and Therefore Violate the Fourth
Amendment
Reasonableness is the touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis. 20
Whether a search is unreasonable “depends on all of the circumstances
surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure
19. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1563 (2013) (holding that “adopting
the State's per se approach . . . might well diminish the incentive for jurisdictions ‘to pursue
progressive approaches to warrant acquisition that preserve the protections afforded by the
warrant while meeting the legitimate interests of law enforcement’”) (citation omitted).
20. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (“As the text makes clear, ‘the ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’” (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398,
403 (2006))).
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itself,” and entails “balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.” 21 Moreover, given “the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness
inquiry,” the Court “evaluate[s] each case of alleged exigency based on its
own facts and circumstances.” 22 As the Court noted in McNeely,
“[n]umerous police actions are judged based on fact-intensive, totality of
the circumstances analyses rather than according to categorical rules,
including in situations that are more likely to require police officers to make
difficult split-second judgments.” 23 Against this backdrop, at least one court
has held that “a warrantless blood test, performed without consent, is
presumptively unreasonable unless the state actors involved had probable
cause and exigent circumstances sufficient to justify it.” 24
As set forth below, by its clear terms, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1
creates a per se exception to the warrant requirement, thus precluding the
fact-intensive, case-by-case reasonableness analysis required of searches in
particular contexts. In addition, N.D. Century Code § 39-20-1 provides law
enforcement officers with alternative and less intrusive means by which to
establish probable cause that a motorist is intoxicated.

21. Skinner v. Railway Lab. Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656 (1979)); see Samson v. California, 547 U.S.
843, 848 (2006) (“[W]e ‘examin[e] the totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether
a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting United States
v. Knights, 534 U.S 112, 118 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
22. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1559 (quoting Go–Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344, 357 (1931)), abrogated by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); see Riley v.
California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494 (2014) (noting “the exigent circumstances exception
requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each
particular case”) (emphasis added); Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 406 (noting that officers' entry
into a home to provide emergency assistance was “plainly reasonable under the
circumstances”); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (concluding that a
warrantless seizure of a person to prevent him from returning to his trailer to destroy hidden
contraband was reasonable “[i]n the circumstances of the case before us” due to exigency);
see generally Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
23. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1564.
24. Marshall v. Columbia Lea Regional Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1172 (10th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis added). The Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Neville, in which it held that
warrantless blood searches do not violate the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against SelfIncrimination, is inapposite. 459 U.S. 553 (1983). First, Neville addressed the
constitutionality of warrantless blood tests in an entirely different context. Second, in
Neville, law enforcement did not have alternative and less intrusive means at their disposal
(breathalyzer and urine tests) by which to determine if a motorist is driving under the
influence of alcohol.
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A. N.D. Century Code § 39-20-01 Impermissibly Establishes a Per Se
Exception to the Warrant Requirement
In a variety of contexts, the Court has refused to adopt a per se
exception to the warrant requirement. 25 In McNeely, a four-member
plurality of the Court specifically rejected the state’s attempt to create such
an exception. 26 Writing for the plurality, Justice Sotomayor held that the
natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood—the most common reason given
to justify warrantless blood tests—does not support a per se exigency
exception. 27 Furthermore, the fact that “some circumstances will make
obtaining a warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the
bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted
warrantless blood test,” is only “a reason to decide each case on its facts . . .
not to accept the “considerable overgeneralization” that a per se rule would
reflect.” 28 For example, in situations where “the warrant process will not
significantly increase the delay before the blood test is conducted because
an officer can take steps to secure a warrant while the suspect is being
transported to a medical facility by another officer,” there could be no
“plausible justification for an exception to the warrant requirement.”29 As
such, “[w]hile the desire for a bright-line rule is understandable, the Fourth
Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad categorical
approach that would dilute the warrant requirement in a context where
significant privacy interests are at stake.” 30

25. See, e.g., Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 391–96 (1997) (rejecting a per
se exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony drug investigations based on
presumed exigency, and requiring instead evaluation of police conduct “in a particular
case”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (holding that “[w]e cannot . . .
excuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who seek exemption
from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of the situation made [the search]
imperative”).
26. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1564 (“While the desire for a bright-line rule is
understandable, the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly broad
categorical approach that would dilute the warrant requirement in a context where significant
privacy interests are at stake.”).
27. See id. at 1563, 1568 (holding that “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the
bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a
blood test without a warrant” and that “whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving
suspect is reasonable “must be determined case by case based on the totality of the
circumstances”).
28. Id. at 1555 (quoting Richards, 520 U.S. at 393).
29. Id. at 1561.
30. Id. at 1564.
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In addition, evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless blood tests on
a case-by-case basis is consistent with the practices of many states. Several
states, for example, “lift restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing if law
enforcement officers first obtain a search warrant or similar court order.” 31
In addition, “a majority of States either place significant restrictions on
when police officers may obtain a blood sample despite a suspect's refusal
(often limiting testing to cases involving an accident resulting in death or
serious bodily injury) or prohibit nonconsensual blood tests altogether.” 32
For these reasons, the portion of N.D. Century Code § 39-20-01 authorizing
warrantless and nonconsensual blood tests cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Of course, this is not to say warrantless blood tests will never be
permissible, or that dissipation of blood alcohol level will never be a
permissible basis upon which to conduct such a test. It is to say, however,
that their lawfulness should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to
determine if they comport with Fourth Amendment requirements. 33
B. Law Enforcement Officers Have Less Intrusive Means at their Disposal
to Determine if a Motorist is Driving While Intoxicated
Since N.D. Century Code § 39-20-01 authorizes law enforcement
officers to perform less intrusive tests (breathalyzer and urine) to establish
probable cause that a motorist is driving while intoxicated, there is little, if
any, need to subject every motorist to a warrantless blood test. In Nelson v.
City of Irvine,34 the Ninth Circuit invalidated a strikingly similar law
permitting warrantless tests of a motorist’s blood, breath, or urine. 35 In so
holding, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[w]hen a DUI
arrestee consents to undergo a breath or urine test, the government has
available to it an effective alternative to a blood test as a means of obtaining
the same evidence.” 36 Furthermore, “breath and urine tests are equally

31. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 1559 (holding that “[w]e apply this ‘finely tuned approach’ to Fourth
Amendment reasonableness in this context because the police action at issue lacks ‘the
traditional justification that . . . a warrant . . . provides’”) (quoting Atwater v. Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 347 n.16 (2016)).
34. See generally Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F. 3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1998).
35. See id. at 1207–08 (outlining an instance in which the 9th Circuit invalidated a law
permitting the testing of a motorist’s blood, breath, or urine without a warrant).
36. Id. at 1201.
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effective as a blood test in determining whether a suspect has violated the
DUI law.” 37
Although equally effective, breath and urine tests are far less intrusive
than blood tests. In Skinner, the Court stated:
Unlike blood tests, breath tests do not require piercing the skin and
may be conducted safely outside a hospital environment and with a
minimum of inconvenience or embarrassment. Further, breath tests
reveal the level of alcohol in the employee's bloodstream and nothing
more . . . [B]reath tests reveal no other facts in which the employee has
a substantial privacy interest. 38

The Riley Court recognized that a cell phone, unlike a passenger
compartment or plastic container, “collects in one place many distinct types
of information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a
video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record.” 39
Additionally, in McNeely, the four-member plurality emphasized that
“[s]tates have a broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving
laws and to secure BAC evidence without undertaking warrantless
nonconsensual blood draws.” 40 For example, “all 50 States have adopted
implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a
motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are
arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.” 41
At bottom, McNeely and Nelson stand for the proposition that when
law enforcement officers have alternative means available to establish
probable cause that a suspect was operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated, there is no need to conduct a warrantless, nonconsensual, and
far more intrusive search (i.e., a blood test). 42 For this reason, “[n]o matter
37. Id.
38. Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 625 (1989) (emphasis added).
39. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014).
40. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013).
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F. 3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“Consent to a breathalyzer test may very well have reduced to insignificance the defendants'
need to extract [defendant’s] blood.”) (quoting Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d 842, 846 (9th
Cir. 1991). Additionally, in McNeely the Court has identified various circumstances where
an exigency renders it impractical to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (finding law enforcement were in “hot pursuit” of a
fleeing suspect); see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509–10 (1978) (entering a burning
building to put out a fire and investigate its cause). Exigencies are also based on the need to
prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. See, e.g. generally, Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291, 296 (1973); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40–41 (1963) (plurality opinion). As the
Court held in McNeely, those circumstances are not present where law enforcement takes a
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how serious the offense, the availability of an equally effective, consensual
method of obtaining the evidence conclusively renders use of
the nonconsensual method unreasonable.” 43 Put simply, absent a
compelling need to administer a warrantless blood test, there can be no
exigency. 44 For these reasons, warrantless blood tests, like warrantless cell
phone searches, should be prohibited unless law enforcement officers are
faced with exigent circumstances.
III. The Criminalization of a Motorist’s Refusal to Consent to a Warrantless
Blood Test Violates the Fourth Amendment
Given that N.D. Century Code § 39-20-01 fails to withstanding
constitutional scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment, the Court should hold
that a suspect’s refusal to consent under N.D. Century Code § 39-08-01
likewise violates the Fourth Amendment. In so holding, the Court should
analogize to Riley and conclude that warrantless blood tests constitute an
unprecedented expansion of the implied consent doctrine.
A. Riley Provides the Framework Upon Which to Invalidate N.D. Cent.
Code. § 39-08-01
The parallels between Riley and Birchfield are striking and the analysis
articulated by the Court in Riley offers an elegant model for both
conducting the necessary balancing of privacy rights and public safety,
while also providing clear guidance to law enforcement in handling DWI
investigations. The link with Riley and the rule it articulates is a logical one
and allows the Court to hold that that the original justifications underlying
the implied consent doctrine—deterring drunk driving and protecting public
safety—do not support a wholesale exception for warrantless blood test and
certainly not the criminalization of a refusal to consent to such tests. As in
warrantless and nonconsensual blood test of a motorist suspected of driving while
intoxicated.
43. See Hammer, 932 F.2d at 852 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (noting that, “[i]f the
suspect requests a breath or urine test and it will do the job just as well, it must be used in
lieu of a blood test-even where the suspected crime is murder in the first degree”).
44. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (noting that exigent
circumstances are present “when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law
enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment”).
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Riley, where the Court held that the search incident to arrest doctrine did
not permit law enforcement to conduct warrantless searches irrespective of
threats to officer safety or the need to preserve evidence, the implied
consent doctrine should not be construed to mean that officers can always
conduct warrantless blood tests regardless of the need to obtain evidence of
intoxication. Indeed, in Riley the Court was cognizant that the holdings in
Belton and Gant had rendered searches incident to arrest nearly limitless
and, in response, established categorical limits to protect an arrestees’
admittedly reduced privacy rights. Importantly, warrantless cell phone
searches not only failed to implicate officer safety and evidence
preservation, but they constituted a far more severe infringement on
personal privacy rights. 45 Of course, the Court did not hold that warrantless
cell phone searches were never justified, but it did adopt a case-by-case
balancing test that carefully weighed the necessity of such searches with an
arrestee’s privacy rights.
Although implied consent laws were not at issue in Riley, the Court’s
reasoning, as well as the rule adopted, should be applied to warrantless
blood tests. Unlike breathalyzer or urine tests, which can accurately
ascertain a motorist’s blood alcohol level, warrantless blood tests, like cell
phone searches, are far more intrusive and have the potential to reveal
information in which a motorist has a substantial and objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy (e.g., the presence of prescription drugs).
Furthermore, just as arrestees retain significant privacy interests in the
contents of a cell phone despite having a reduced expectation of privacy on
public roadways, motorists also retain a substantial privacy interest in their
bodily integrity, particularly where alternative search methods are available
to ensure that law enforcement’s interest in deterring drunk driving is not
hindered. 46 In fact, as the McNeely Court noted, “we never retreated . . .
45. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014). Justice Roberts stated as
follows:
[T]here is an element of pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not
physical records. Prior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache
of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their day. Now it
is the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is
the exception. According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smart phone users
report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12%
admitting that they even use their phones in the shower.
46. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1565 (2013) (“[T]he fact that people
are “accorded less privacy in . . . automobiles because of th[e] compelling governmental
need for regulation . . . does not diminish a motorist's privacy interest in preventing an agent
of the government from piercing his skin.” (quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392
(1985))).
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from our recognition that use of th[e] compelling governmental need for
regulation . . . does not diminish a motorist's privacy interest in preventing
an agent of the government from piercing his skin.” 47 To hold otherwise
would give law enforcement nearly unbridled authority to conduct
unnecessary and unreasonable searches despite having alternative—and less
invasive—means by which to procure the same evidence.
The table below summarizes the parallels between the search incident
to arrest and implied consent doctrines.
Doctrine

Original
Justifications

Permissible
Searches

Impermissible
expansions

Search Incident
to Arrest

Officer safety and
evidence
preservation

Limited searches
of the arrestee’s
person and
wingspan

Warrantless searches
of cell phones

Implied Consent

Deterring drunk
driving and
protecting public
safety

Breathalyzer,
urine, and field
sobriety tests;
inference of
guilt when
motorists refuse
such tests

Warrantless blood
tests

B. A Case-By-Case Evaluation of Warrantless Blood Testing Will Provide
Guidance to Law Enforcement Officers and Protect Motorists’ Privacy
Rights
Evaluating the reasonableness of warrantless blood tests on a case-bycase basis will appropriately balance the need of law enforcement to protect
the public with a suspect’s privacy interest. To begin with, law enforcement
officers will continue to have at their disposal a number of tools, such as
field, breath, and urine tests, to establish probable cause that a suspect is
driving while intoxicated. Thus, law enforcement will not be hindered in its
ongoing efforts to protect public safety and deter drunk driving. As the
47. Id.; see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (holding that “invasions of
bodily integrity” implicate an individual’s “most personal and deeply-rooted expectations of
privacy”).
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McNeely plurality explained, “[w]e are aware of no evidence indicating that
restrictions on nonconsensual blood testing have compromised drunkdriving enforcement efforts in the States that have them.” 48 In fact, “field
studies in States that permit nonconsensual blood testing pursuant to a
warrant have suggested that, although warrants do impose administrative
burdens, their use can reduce breath-test-refusal rates and improve law
enforcement's ability to recover BAC evidence.” 49
Second, technological advances substantially increase the likelihood
that officers will have sufficient time to procure a warrant before blood
alcohol levels begin to dissipate. As the Court noted in McNeely, “a
majority of States allow police officers or prosecutors to apply for search
warrants remotely through various means, including telephonic or radio
communication, electronic communication such as e-mail, and video
conferencing.” 50 In addition, “jurisdictions have found other ways to
streamline the warrant process, such as by using standard-form warrant
applications for drunk-driving investigations.” 51 Thus, adopting a per se
exigency exception would disregard “the current and future technological
developments in warrant procedures.” 52 Furthermore, a case-by-case
approach will incentivize law enforcement to carefully consider whether the
circumstances justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, rather than
give law enforcement freewheeling authority to take a suspect’s blood at
any time—and for whatever reason. 53
Third, a case-by-case approach will enable officers to take warrantless
blood samples where they are faced with a true exigency. 54 To say that such
exigencies may occur, however, does not mean that they always will occur.
Without evaluating each case on its merits, the likelihood that citizens’ will
48. Id. at 1567.
49. Id. at 1566–67 (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710–11
(2011); NHTSA, Use of Warrants for Breath Test Refusal: Case Studies 36–38 (No. 810852,
Oct. 2007)).
50. Id. at 1562.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1563 (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771, 779 (Utah 2007)).
53. See id. (noting that a per se rule “might well diminish the incentive for
jurisdictions to pursue progressive approaches to warrant acquisition that preserve the
protections afforded by the warrant while meeting the legitimate interests of law
enforcement”).
54. See id. (explaining that “longer intervals may raise questions about the accuracy of
the calculation,” such that exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless blood sample may
arise in the regular course of law enforcement due to delays from the warrant application
process).
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suffer substantial—and unreasonable—infringements on their privacy
would increase, even though the benefit to law enforcement and the public,
particularly given the availability of breath, urine, and field sobriety tests,
would not. This is precisely what would result from a per se exigency
exception to the warrant requirement, and precisely why the portion of N.D.
Century Code § 39-20-01 authorizing law enforcement to conduct
warrantless and nonconsensual blood tests fails to pass constitutional
muster.
Conclusion
Although the interest in deterring drunk driving and protecting the
public cannot be overstated, the importance of protecting privacy rights is
far too often understated. In an era where technological advancements
enable law enforcement to investigate criminal activity in a manner the
Founders could not possibly foresee, few would doubt that the benefits of
technology also bring grave threats to individual and collective liberty.
However, as courts struggle to balance privacy rights with the investigatory
powers that new technology enables, they must not overlook the more
conventional threats to privacy, as present in Birchfield, that often lurk
under the Fourth Amendment radar. States cannot—and should not—be
allowed to weaken privacy protections through laws, such as N.D. Century
Code §§ 39-20-1 and 39-08-01, compelling motorists, under threat of
criminal prosecution, to consent to warrantless blood tests that, at least in
some cases, are neither necessary nor reasonable. If N.D. Century Code
§§ 39-20-1 and 39-08-01 are upheld, the Court will send a message that
states can circumvent the Fourth Amendment with legislation that
admittedly achieves worthy policy objectives, yet does so at the expense of
core constitutional protections. In Riley, the Court’s decision recognized
this fact, and implicit in its holding was the admonition that the objective of
serving the public good, such as by deterring drunk driving, must not be
achieved through procedures that make the public less free and the
Constitution less relevant.

